




ecause of a very weak economy, which lowered
tax revenues and raised government spending,
Japan’s fiscal balance has deteriorated rapidly. The
budget,in surplus until 1992,turned negative in 1993,
and the deficits continued to worsen, reaching
almost 11 percent of GDP in 1998.The government
debt-GDP ratio increased by almost 50 percent from
1991 to 1997, and by another 40 percent in the four
years after that. By 2000, Japan had the largest ratio
among Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) member countries.
Japan’s fiscal situation continues to look grim,
especially given the demographic situation.
Population aging is expected to slow economic
growth and raise future government health care
and social security expenditures. Projections of the
country’s population and the percentage of the
total population that is elderly are plotted in the
figure below. The population over sixty-five has
grown rapidly and now stands at about 15 percent.
By 2020, its percentage is ex-
pected to approach 25 percent,
and by 2050, 33 percent.
These rates of aging are much
higher than for example, in the
United States, where only about
15 percent of the population will
be over sixty-five by 2025.
Japan’s recent fiscal position
Recently, government saving
has been declining and public
investment has been rising (Table 1). These recent
trends in government saving and investment were
caused by the recession, and also by structural
changes. The recession and the decline in the rate
of economic growth lowered tax revenues.
Structural changes worsening government saving
include tax reforms that lowered tax elasticities
and tax revenues, and the aging of the population,
which raised social security and healthcare expen-
ditures. The deterioration of government finances
led to sharp increases in outstanding government
bonds, raising concerns about fiscal sustainability
and calls for fiscal reform.
Recent government saving
Tax revenues declined because of the recent
recessionary environment. In addition, govern-
ment consumption increased. Owing to the low
cyclical variability of Japanese unemployment
and social welfare benefits, however, government
consumption increases during the recession were
capped. Government saving can be divided into
the ”full-employment” and ”cyclical” compo-
nents. We estimate that during the period
1991–99, Japan’s ”full-employment” government
saving was about 2.6 percent, slightly higher than
actual government saving of 2.0 percent, leaving
the ”cyclical” component of government saving at
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– 0.6 percent.1 Thus, much of the recent decline in
Japanese government saving was not because of
”automatic stabilizers,” but because of structural
factors, such as tax reductions.
Government saving has declined since the early to
mid-1990s, with tax reductions supporting aggre-
gate demand in the face of an unprecedented eco-
nomic downturn. Particularly in 1998, when the
economy slipped into recession, the government
passed tax cut measures that led to a substantial
decline in government saving in the following year.
Marginal income and capital gains tax rates and
health insurance premia were cut, exemptions for
gift taxes were raised, and tax deductions for home
mortgage holders were introduced. The govern-
ment also lowered corporate tax rates from 50 per-
cent to 40 percent.
Recent public investment
Between 1990 and now, the Japanese government
passed ten stimulus packages, in an attempt to
jump-start the stalling economy. The most impor-
tant component of the government stimulus pack-
ages were public works, which are included in pub-
lic investment. However, as shown in Table 1, the
actual increases in public investment in the late
1990s were rather moderate, compared to the
prominent – and headline grabbing – role of public
works in the stimulus packages.
There are two reasons why actual public works fell
short of the levels announced in stimulus packages.
First, during the 1990s, the cen-
tral government assigned rough-
ly two-thirds of the increased
public works spending to local
governments (without providing
a commensurate increase in
funding).The capacity, however,
of local governments to expand
public investment was affected
by their poor financial situation,
and the continued rise in public
investment has increasingly
been financed through local
bond issues.The amount of out-
standing local government
bonds increased from 12 percent of GDP in 1990 to
22 percent of GDP in 1997.Many local governments
surpassed the legally allowed threshold of bonds
outstanding, and were put under bond issuance
restrictions by the central government. Second,
some of the public investment funds provided by the
stimulus packages remained unused because of
poor project implementation.
Recent government debt and liabilities
The late 1990s decline in government saving and
rise in public investment led to sharp increases in
government debt.Table 2 depicts the fiscal balance-
GDP ratio, and several debt to GDP ratios.The fis-
cal balance-GDP ratio is lower than the difference
between the government saving-GDP ratio and the
public investment-GDP ratio by about 2 percent,
mainly because of the inclusion of net government
land purchases in the fiscal balance. During the
1990s, the government bought significant amounts
of land from the private sector to prop up land
prices. The fiscal surplus declined continuously in
the 1990s, reaching about minus 10 percent in 1998.
Correspondingly,the ratio of debt to GDP has risen
sharply. By international standards, Japan’s gross
debt-GDP ratio in 1999 was the highest among the
G-7 countries – Italy’s was 115 percent, and the
United States’ was 62 percent.
Because of the partly funded nature of the
Japanese pension system, as well as the govern-
ment’s major role in financial intermediation, the
Japanese government holds significant assets,
keeping net debt to GDP at a moderate level, and
lower than in other G-7 countries. However, since
the assets of the social security system are more
than offset by future pension obligations, they
should be excluded when assessing Japan’s debt
Table 1
Japanese Private and Government Saving, Investment, and Net Exports













1955–73 13.5 9.5 17.3 7.3 – 1.5
1974–79 26.3 3.1 20.7 9.2 – 0.6
1980–90 26.0 4.5 20.7 7.4 2.4
1991–95 26.0 5.2 21.5 7.7 1.9
1996–99 28.4 1.6 20.3 8.0 1.8
a Includes net social security surplus. – 
b Includes plant and equipment,
housing, and  inventory investment.
Source: Ecnomic and Social Research Institute, Annual Report on the
National Accounts, 1999 and 2001 editions.
1 We estimate the “full-employment” government saving by
regressing government saving on the output gap and a constant.We
interpret the estimated value of the constant; which is the govern-
ment saving rate when the output gap is equal to zero – as “full-
employment” government saving.situation. As a result, Japan’s  net debt  excluding
social security net assets, at 85 percent, is signifi-
cantly higher than in the United States, at 60 per-
cent, and in Germany, at 53 percent.
The government’s true net obligations may be sub-
stantially higher than the net debt figures because
of unfunded liabilities. There are three main
sources of unfunded liabilities. The first source is
the future costs of government social security and
health schemes. Estimates of future unfunded
social security costs depend on demographic, eco-
nomic growth, and interest rate assumptions and
range widely. In Japan, there are several social
security schemes, but the main scheme – the
Employees’ Pension Scheme – derives one-third of
its (benefit) payouts from government subsidies,
and two-thirds of its payouts from payroll taxes
(contributions). Muhleisen (2000) estimates the
present value of net unfunded liabilities at 60 per-
cent of GDP. With regards to government health
benefits, on average, government subsidies cover
about one-third of total public health insurance
benefits (2 percent of GDP), with the rest covered
by health insurance contributions and co-pay-
ments. Given that the elderly are exempt from
health insurance contributions and pay only small
co-payments, the future aging of the population is
expected to significantly raise the proportion of
health benefits covered by government subsidies.
The second source of unfunded liabilities is poten-
tial losses on government assets. A portion of the
government’s assets represents soft loans that may
not be repaid. Many large public or joint public-
private infrastructure projects financed from Fiscal
Investment and Loan Program (FILP) loans gener-
ate less revenue than budgeted, which may imply
significant contingent liabilities of the government.
For example, much of the substantial debt – 3 per-
cent of GDP – of the now privatized Japan
National Railways is owed to FILP. Since most of
this debt will never be repaid, this debt will even-
tually have to be covered from the government
budget. Other public corporations with large accu-
mulated FILP debt include the Japan Highway
Corporation (4 percent of GDP) and the Housing
and Urban Development Corporation (2.5 percent
of GDP).
The third source of unfunded liabilities is the
explicit and implicit government guarantees of pri-
vate sector lending.Explicit guarantees are extend-
ed by FILP and other government entities to
encourage lending by private financial institutions.
Examples are guarantees of bank deposits by the
Deposit Insurance Corporation and guarantees of
lending by credit cooperatives to small- and medi-
um-sized enterprises. Although, these guarantees
do not entail fresh government lending, should the
guaranteed loans not be repaid, the government
must cover the loans from the budget. The total
amount of outstanding government-guaranteed
bonds and loans amounted to about 10 percent of
GDP in 2000. Although historically, only about
1 percent of government-guaranteed loans are
never repaid, if the Japanese economy worsens, the
percentage of unpaid loans could soar (Bayoumi,
1998).
In addition to the explicitly guaranteed govern-
ment loans and bonds,there are the implicitly guar-







Overview of Government Finances
(all figures in percent of GDP)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Fiscal balance
a 1.9 1.8 0.8 – 2.4 – 2.8 – 4.1 – 4.9 – 3.7 – 10,7 – 7,0
Government Saving
of which:
7.2 7.2 6.7 4.7 4.2 2.9 2.6 2.6 1.2 0.0
Social security surplus 1.3 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 0,8 0.4
Healthcare – 3.6 – 3.5 – 3.7 – 3.8 – 3.9 – 4.1 – 4.2 – 4.1 – 4.2 – 4.3
Other  surplus 9.5 9.0 8.8 7.1 7.0 5.9 5.6 5.5 4.6 3.9
Gross debt 65.1 64.7 67.6 72.7 78.4 85.4 91.8 97.5 108.5 120.5
Net debt A
b 7.3 6.4 12.3 10.1 12.1 16.9 21.6 27.9 38.0 44.4
Net Debt B
c 35.4 35.5 42.9 42.8 46.6 52.5 57.7 64.6 75.9 84.9
a Government Saving plus Net Land Purchases and Net Gift and Inheritance Taxes minus Public Investment. –
b Including social security system assets. – 
c Excluding social security system assets.





anteed government loans. Historically, the
Japanese government has shown willingness to
cover the irrecoverable problem loans of private
financial institutions.For example,in 1998,the gov-
ernment authorized 60 trillion yen (12 percent of
GDP) in public funding to cover the irrecoverable
loans of private banks.2 This willingness represents
implicit guarantees, and these guarantees are con-
tingent liabilities of the government. In 2000, out-
standing loans minus the capital and liquid assets
of financial institutions was about 200 percent of
GDP.If,as some bank analysts estimate,10 percent
of the loans are irrecoverable, then the cost to the
government of these implicit guarantees could be
as high as 20 percent of GDP.
Fiscal sustainability
The sharp increase in Japanese government debt in
the 1990s has raised questions about the sustain-
ability of this debt, and much policy work has been
done in this area. Clearly, at current Japanese gov-
ernment fiscal deficit levels, the government debt
will keep on growing. For, given growth and inter-
est rate assumptions, the fiscal surplus exclusive of
net debt interest payments, or the primary fiscal sur-
plus, necessary to stabilize the debt-GDP ratio is:
b = (r – gr) * d ,
(1 + gr)
where b is the primary surplus-GDP ratio, r is the
long-run real interest rate, gr is the long-run real
growth rate of GDP, and d is the debt-GDP ratio.
For example, assume that r and gr are 0.06 and
0.012. To stabilize the debt-GDP ratio at the cur-
rent net debt-GDP ratio of 0.85, the government
will have to run a primary fiscal surplus-GDP ratio
of almost 5 percent. Given the current cyclically-
adjusted primary fiscal deficit-GDP ratio of about
4 percent, to keep the debt-GDP ratio at the cur-
rent level,the required increase in the primary bal-
ance would be 9 percent of GDP.
It would be very difficult for the government to
achieve this adjustment in the primary balance
through fiscal reform in the near future.Thus,some
analysts have argued that the government may
attempt to lower the real value of the debt through
inflation. Since Japanese government bonds pay a
nominal coupon rate, inflation will lower the real
return on bonds, and the real interest rate. From
the equation above, we can see that the fall in the
real interest rate will lower the required adjust-
ment in the primary deficit.
Recent fiscal reform measures
To restrain increases in the debt-GDP ratio, the
government has proposed several fiscal reform
measures in the 1990s. However, most of the mea-
sures were postponed or abandoned, as the gov-
ernment sought to stimulate demand in light of the
very weak domestic economy. Specifically, in 1997,
the government enacted the Fiscal Structural
Reform Law.The goal of the 1997 Law was to elim-
inate fiscal deficits by 2003.
The main instruments in the 1997 Law were cuts in
government consumption and investment, rather
than tax increases. Public investment spending was
to be cut by 7 percent in 1998, with zero nominal
growth until 2001;and energy,education,and over-
seas development assistance were to be cut by
10 percent in 1998, with annual reductions until
2001 (Ishi, 2000, p. 149). However, with the severe
recession of 1997, fiscal consolidation was put on
hold, and a wide-range of pump-priming measures
were introduced. In particular, rather than declin-
ing, public investment for 1998 was increased by
over 10 percent.
Areas where the 1997 Law made progress were in
healthcare and social security reform, which are
important, given the aging of the population. In 1997,
the contribution rate and co-payments by patients for
the government health insurance schemes were
increased sharply (Ishi, 2000). In particular, patients
aged 70 and above are required to pay a fixed pro-
portion (10 percent) of their medical costs. The gov-
ernment also capped prescription drug prices, which
are very high in Japan. In 2000, a pension reform bill
based on the 1997 Law passed the legislature.The bill
contained provisions to cut lifetime pension benefits
by about 20 percent. Specifically, pension benefits for
new retirees were cut by 5 percent;the age of pension
eligibility will be gradually (from 2013) raised from 60
to 65; and pension benefits will be subject to an earn-
ings test. Analysts have estimated that the 2000 pen-
sion reforms will reduce government unfunded social
security liabilities from the current 60 percent of
GDP to 30 percent of GDP (IMF, 2000).
2 The total of public funds actually spent – and included in govern-
ment consumption – in 2000 was about 8 trillion yen (0.16 percent
of GDP).Looking forward, the government is planning on
implementing further budget cuts, once the econo-
my fully recovers.Recently,a political commitment
has been made to cap government deficit bond
issues at 30 trillion yen (0.6 percent of GDP) in
2002. Although “deficit” bonds reflect only a por-
tion of total government borrowing, this bond
issuance ceiling should help lower future fiscal
deficits.
As stipulated in the 1997 Law, public investment is
due for further cuts. Criticism has been directed at
the economic value of the public works projects, as
well as contracting procedures.To address the effi-
ciency issues, new cost-benefit guidelines for
review of public works projects were announced.
Contracting procedures have also been reformed.
Public works projects are scheduled to be cut
severely, although whether the cuts will actually
materialize is unclear. Moreover, the government
intends to change the form of public works from
the traditional type of construction projects to
broader social infrastructure investment; for envi-
ronment and energy-related projects, telecommu-
nications networks, scientific research, nursing
homes, and the like.
With regards to healthcare, contribution rates and
co-payments, especially by the elderly, are planned
to be increased further. The government’s stated
goal is to restrict the growth of medical costs of the
elderly to no more than the rate of inflation. The
age of eligibility for special elderly medical care
will eventually be raised from 70 to 75.Further cuts
are also planned in social security; for example,
there are suggestions that average benefits should
further be reduced by about 40 percent, to avoid
large increases in future contribution rates.
Concluding comments
The prospects for improvements in the Japanese
fiscal situation are grim unless the government car-
ries out significant fiscal reform. Japanese citizens
should brace themselves for painful adjustments in
the near future,in the form of lower public services
and higher taxes.
A resumption of strong growth in real GDP would
reduce the need for spending and tax adjustments.
For example, from our fiscal sustainabiliy analysis
above, if real interest rates are 3 percent, a real
GDP growth rate of slightly in excess of 3 percent
can imply falling debt-to-GDP ratios. The analysis
there has assumed that real growth averages just
1.2 percent per year.This assumes total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP) growth of 2.0 percent per year.
TFP growth of 2.0 percent is actually an assump-
tion on the high side, as it is equal to Japan’s aver-
age TFP growth between 1970 and 1990, and Japan
has not been as innovative as it was then. What
lowers GDP growth from 2.0 percent to 1.0 percent
is the dramatic annual decline in the labor force
caused by the aging of the population.
Thus, one way to increase GDP growth is to raise
the labor supply. Possibilities include removing the
impediments that restrict the movement of labor
between firms and encouraging women from par-
ticipating to a greater extent. Another possibility
that has received scant attention until now is to
promote immigration into Japan.
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Without significant
fiscal reforms,
prospects are grim